

*Background Material  
of 31 October*

State Dept. review completed

*180015*

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Approved For Release 2003/04/24 : CIA-RDP80B01676R001800010032-9

ACTION: USUN. New York

SUBJECT: CUBA: New York Negotiations

1. GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS

25X1 Please be guided by the following in your New York negotiations whose entire purpose is to reach final solution, in framework of exchanges of letters between President and Khrushchev, of problems created by introduction by USSR of offensive weapons into Cuba. In spite of Kuznetsov's eagerness to discuss disarmament, bases, and other broader questions  the present negotiation should not include issues beyond immediate objective, which is verified dismantling and removal of Soviet offensive weapons in Cuba at earliest possible date.

Your purpose will be to reach straightforward realistic solutions to practical problems along lines indicated below. We assume that in line with established Soviet doctrine, Kuznetsov's insistence on physical inspection of dismantling and removal Soviet weapons is essentially non-negotiable. It is probable, therefore, that we shall have to rely on aerial surveillance and post-removal inspection to satisfy ourselves that missile bases are dismantled and weapons are removed from Cuba or destroyed.

While you should strive for as much pre-removal ground inspection as possible, the formula of post-removal ground inspection together with high and low aerial surveillance during both the dismantling period and the post-evacuation period should, if efficiently carried out provide adequate evidence of removal and destruction and so could be accepted.

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## 2. DEFINITION OF OFFENSIVE WEAPONS

The offensive weapons which the United States insists be removed from Cuba and not be further imported into Cuba are those enumerated in the Presidential Proclamation 3504 of October 23. The list is as follows: Surface-to-surface missiles; bomber aircraft; bombs, air-to-surface rockets and guided missiles; warheads for any of the above weapons; mechanical or electronic equipment to support or operate the above items. Also, pursuant to authority granted in the Proclamation, the Secretary of Defense, in Special Warning (Notice to Mariners) No. 31, stated that the prohibition of surface-to-surface missiles covers a prohibition of missile propellants and chemical compounds capable of being used to power missiles. *Now about Komar or other vessels*

Note that the definition includes short-range surface-to-surface missiles and surface-to-surface missiles designed for use at sea. Notice also that mechanical and electronic equipment to operate surface-to-surface missiles includes a wide variety of communications, supply and missile-launching equipment [including Komar class motor torpedo boats].

Suggest you start with wider definition, including supplement to Presidential Proclamation. Fall back position, on which we would insist, would be categories enumerated in Proclamation.

Not included in formal definition are Soviet troops and technicians. However, we should assume on basis Khrushchev letter of October 26 that "the necessity for the presence of

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[Soviet] military specialists in Cuba would disappear" along with the offensive weapons they are manning and protecting.

Also not included within the definition are fighter aircraft, [Komar class motor torpedo boats] and surface-to-air missiles. Also not included are storage sites or any petroleum products other than missile propellants. It would be desirable to have these items destroyed or removed as well, but the USG is not willing to pay a price to have them destroyed or removed.

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3. TWO-PHASE PROGRAM.

The US envisages two phases in the UN verification program, each requiring specific control measures:

(a) First Phase - This phase should begin immediately and would cover the period up to the Soviet report to the SC that they have dismantled and withdrawn proscribed weapons. Since the Communists will undoubtedly prove chary of UN observation of weapons withdrawal, as Kuznetzov has already indicated, we assume they are unlikely to accept on-site inspection during the period when weapons are being withdrawn. Therefore we probably will need to rely in practice, during the first stage, on (i) US and UN aerial reconnaissance and (ii) UN/ICRC inspection of incoming shipments.

(b) Second Phase - This phase would begin when the SC convened to receive the Soviet report on compliance and to authorize establishment of a UN on-site inspection system. During this period, verification of compliance would be accomplished through: (i) continued aerial reconnaissance; (ii) continued inspection incoming cargoes; and (iii) ground inspection.

This phase would end when the SC has accepted the report of the SYG that offensive weapons have been removed from Cuba.

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4. AERIAL RECONNAISSANCE.

Systematic high and low aerial reconnaissance is essential. This is so particularly if surface inspection is limited or non-existent. The reconnaissance, or any aspect of it, can be done either by the US or by the UN. Our only insistence is that a job be done which is adequate to provide the USG with information sufficient to convince US that compliance is taking place.

We recognize that (unlike US) UN will wish to overfly Cuba only after explicit clearance by Cuban authorities.

US would of course need access to photos resulting from UN reconnaissance.

Two types of air surveillance should be considered -- photographic (high and low) and visual monitoring by holding the aircraft in a pattern so as to maintain continuous air surveillance of missile transport movements.

The Canadian government has offered to have Canadian pilots fly UN (US supplied) RF-101 aircraft. USG endorses use of Canadians and RF-101s but recognizes that SYG will be reluctant to accept. Alternatively we could make available C-130s and within two-week period train air crews from one of the following: Mexico, Argentina, Chile or Colombia. Canada (4 crews) and Indonesia (10 crews) already have competent crews which would take only brief period to check out. There are four C-130 aircraft with the UN markings and high quality photographic equipment in Georgia now available to UN on request. In addition, we have sold C-130 aircraft to Australia and are currently in the midst of completing

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negotiation on providing C-130 aircraft to Argentina and Chile. The UN has been informed that the USG is prepared to provide rapid (jet) transportation for C-130 crews politically acceptable to the UN from anywhere in the world.

Another highly attractive possibility would be for Mexico or Argentina to volunteer squadron of T-11s (C-45s) and crews which DOD believes would be fully capable to do kind of job we want. They have adequate high-quality camera equipment. Mexico has six aircraft and Argentina has a comparable number. Also Sweden has made available for the Congo operation two reconnaissance PT-9s (single-jet aircraft). It is understood that they have a number of such aircraft fully equipped with photographic equipment.

Processing unit with US equipment could be readily provided to operate in Havana or at whatever place UN would wish to use as base of operations.

You should therefore reaffirm all this to SYG, strongly urging him to develop a UN reconnaissance capability. Support of UN surveillance, however, should not (repeat not) be tied to US cessation of surveillance. Statements that QTE The United States will reconsider its surveillance requirements based upon the effectiveness of UN operations UNQTE can be made, but we should do nothing to suggest that US determination to conduct air surveillance is necessarily limited by UN operations.

It should go without saying that to the extent no adequate substitute has been developed by the UN, the US high and low surveillance will continue throughout entire dismantling and withdrawal operation and as long thereafter as necessary to satisfy us that offensive weapons have been fully removed from Cuba.

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5. INCOMING CARGOES.

As indicated DEPTTEL 1136, we prepared accept ICRC inspection incoming cargoes on all ships, of whatever flag, embarked from bloc ports. According to our projection, \_\_\_\_\_ ships now in transit or scheduled depart bloc ports shortly to arrive in Cuba during next three or four weeks. Number Red Cross inspectors required to do job will depend on whether inspection at sea or on shore. Most efficient use manpower would be port inspection at agreed ports. This would permit close inspection of vessels, one after another, without transit time required to shuttle between vessels at sea. Accordingly, hope port inspection agreeable to Cubans. If inspection done at ports, we estimate \_\_\_\_\_ personnel needed. If done on high seas, estimate \_\_\_\_\_ would be required.

We expect thorough inspection, including at least selective examination of cargoes aboard to assure that no weapons we consider offensive will enter Cuba. Inspection should provide for masters of incoming ships to notify their cargoes to UN inspectors well in advance of arrival at port. This would expedite checking and clearance and help make entire inspection process more effective.

We believe inspection of incoming cargoes should continue until entire verification process completed (i.e., through end of Phase Two), in order to give us assurance all offensive

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weapons withdrawn and related facilities dismantled. During this period, enforcement of quarantine would be suspended, but US ships would remain on duty stations. Incoming ships would not be stopped or searched by US, but we would keep a watching brief on all traffic, noting outbound missile-carrying ships and assisting UN inspectors in assuring they informed of all incoming traffic. US would thus be in position to renew immediately the enforcement of the quarantine if circumstances required such action.

6. VERIFICATION OF REMOVAL OF OFFENSIVE WEAPONS

When Soviets prepared to say they have removed from Cuba the "weapons US considers offensive", a Security Council meeting would be called to authorize the Acting Secretary General to establish arrangements for verification. Executive organization operating in Cuba for this purpose is here referred to as UN/Cuba.

(a) Terms of Reference: UN/Cuba

UN teams should inspect on spot, after dismantling, those sites which identified by US as missile bases as well as any Cuban airport which could accommodate bombers and any other area where we have reason to believe there may have been concealment of offensive weapons. Such teams should have unrestricted confidential communication facilities with their headquarters units, and free access to areas required for the performance of their duties.

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US will furnish to UN comprehensive list of locations to be covered.

(b) Number of Observers

The number of observers required to do job satisfactorily will depend on length of time permitted to accomplish task and on the extent of mobility. US would prefer to see such verification accomplished quickly. Assuming for political reasons Communists would prefer keep number UN inspectors relatively small, suggest UN consider possibility utilizing number of helicopters or small planes (which US prepared make available) to permit rapid transit inspection teams maximum number sites in minimum time. It appears to us that team of 50 or 60 men with adequate air transport could accomplish verification job within a week or two. Moreover, any UN aerial observers should participate in verification process.

(c) Composition

While we assume that probably only citizens of certain types of countries will be acceptable to Communists as sources of UN ground observers, it is important from our standpoint that eligibility be restricted to <sup>technically trained personnel of</sup> genuinely reliable ~~nations~~ <sup>who</sup> have demonstrated a reasonable objectivity during crisis. For example, we would wish to exclude UAR and Ghana citizens in light of distinctly "unneutral" statements made by their Delegates

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Delegates in Security Council meetings on Cuba. On criteria indicated, we would prefer nationals from Sweden, Switzerland, Austria, [Nigeria,] India and Ireland. When it comes to UN air reconnaissance, it is probably not so important to have neutral personnel; Canadians and Argentines, for example, might prove acceptable.

7. ADMINISTRATION AND FINANCE

(a) We greatly prefer that any and all of the UN operations that may be created (air reconnaissance group, port inspectors, ground inspection teams) should operate under executive direction of SYG. To the extent the International Committee of the Red Cross is involved, it should (as indicated DEPTTEL 1136) operate as executive agent of SYG. We understand ICRC has operated in similar capacity at UN request in checking compliance with Geneva Convention in US POW camps in Korea. ICRC has acted also as executive agent for High Commissioner for Refugees in Congo.

(b) We believe financing all verification measures should come under \$2,000,000 provision in regular UN budget for small-scale peace and security operations. If total cost likely to exceed one million dollars, financing problem will need to be reviewed in the light of the then U.S. position on financing UN peace-and-security operations.

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MONDAY  
October 29, 1962  
5:22 p. m.

TELEPHONE CALL FROM MR MC CLOY

M said they just came back from Thant and understands Ball gave the Sec a rundown but M will fill in more: There may be a time element - he wanted announcement to go out about the freezing of the quarantining (read it). M asked it has gone out yet and Sec said no - thought tomorrow a. m. M thinks that does not matter. Thinks it should be in that form and only that and no talk about its coming back on. Sec said trouble is he is not going to get to see the sites. M said that is the reason - anxious to have you put in accordance with his request....

Kuznetsov said re Red Cross they would permit them to inspect cargoes to see no arms at all coming in from the Soviet Union to Cuba but did not want personnel to be boarding from American men-of-war - should be from a Russian or neutral vessel. Re operating within the ports - o. k. with him if Castro agrees. Sec said would Red Cross take on a political job like that? M does not know but there was a communication with someone and the upshot was they were anxious to be of service and so perhaps they would be ready. K said he did not make it a ~~new~~ condition but prefers personnel should be composed of neutrals or non-aligned people. Sec said make it Swiss then. M said o. k. and thinks they would be competent. We did not commit on Red Cross. M thinks you might get good personnel from Swiss rather than otherwise - this for inspection at sea or at port if Castro agrees. M said they made it clear there is a problem in the interim because Kuznetsov made it definite there could be no on-site inspection until dismantling had been done. M said we can't be sure they are gone until there is inspection. It ended by our indicating to him we would reserve our right through a UN reconnaissance satisfactory or us or our own air reconnaissance during the period they were saying they were dismantling and then see re on-site inspection thereafter. M replied this was K but thinks he was talking about on-site. They agreed we could work out some arrangement on that. M said to Thant we have to make up our mind whether we would be satisfied in the interval with aerial reconnaissance ~~minus~~ minus assurances on site. M thinks air is better but on site could supplement aerial. Whether K is ready to take that or whether he is just talking about on-site inspection, M does not know but T thinks he would(?) object to aerial inspection. Those are the salient features of this.

Re Cubans: He wanted to make it clear they had made no commitment whatever to the existence of UN body on the Island. They would welcome Thant to talk about it but would negotiate out what they were prepared to do. In conv with Thant re guarantee to Cubans - he saw a copy of letter Stevenson sent yesterday - talking about continuation of absence of weapons: would it mean permanent inspection? If you ask for that he felt the Cubans would ask for the right of UN visitation of CIA establishments around the Caribbean. Sec said it would involve a lot of inspection in Cuba. T said if you don't mean permanent he does not think we will face the problem and he won't bring it up.

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M said Yost was with him and checked to see if he left anything out. JOHNSON indicated he was on the extension and asked what weapons were included? M said we would give him a list of weapons which Sec said Khrushchev mentioned. J sent to Ball some notes on this which might be of help. M said they would watch for those. M said it was clear when he talked about Red Cross inspection he was talking about any weapons. M said the procedure would be when Russians had completed their dismantling and removal they would go to SC and say we have completed this and we propose a UN body go down to confirm the fact that all our commitments have been fulfilled - then there would be a resolution. Sec asked did they say how long? M talked about it at considerable length - our estimate is a month. Thant said he got the contrary impression from K of a week. They did not ask when specifically - this is only an impression. Sec said if so they must have ships around. M said there are - about 13. M said we have to communicate with him whether we would be willing to take a suitable Red Cross inspection on ships. Also have to tell him whether we would be satisfied for an interim period with merely an aerial reconnaissance. Sec said when does he want to know. M thinks before he leaves tomorrow. Sec said we will not know about our takes until early a.m. and should see those before making up our mind. M agreed - wondered if we can communicate when he gets there. He will leave at 10. Sec thinks we may be able to do it by then. M said could do it now on Red Cross. Sec said yes but should give both answers at the same time. Sec asked re atmosphere from Cuban talk. M said they had the idea they might be sticky about conditions. They mentioned Guantanamo and Castro's speech. We were emphatic we would have to have some sort of verification of this during interim period. We could not take the chance. M replied he thinks Thant agreed with that. Modalities had to be discussed and K spoke about how Red Cross would be brought into action etc. M replied their preference for boarding is from neutral or Russian vessels. Sec asked if Thant has asked the Red Cross and M said he will wait until we say it will be satisfactory to us.

M said through his disarmament line he got word this p.m. from Zorin's assistant that K would like to see him. Wondered whether he ought to see him - thinks Stevenson will see him for lunch but he is apparently clandestinely indicating he wants to talk with M. M does not want to go out of line. Sec said to go to see what is on his mind. If we could make moves on disarmament so much the better. M thinks Stevenson is not in accord with this but will talk it over with him.

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